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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the morale of the troops of British VIII Corps on Gallipoli in 
1915-16, using Anthony King’s recent work on combat motivation in infantry 
platoons as a tool of analysis. King, partially rehabilitating the controversial work 
of S.L.A. Marshall, argues that left to themselves, the citizen armies of the early 
twentieth century tended to passivity. Officers resorted to a range of strategies to 
overcome this ‘Marshall Effect’, including appeals to patriotism and masculinity, 
mass tactics, and heroic leadership. It is contended that King’s model works well 
when applied to this case study – such methods were indeed employed by officers 
of VIII Corps - but the jury is out on its wider applicability, pending detailed case 
studies of other campaigns. As this article demonstrates, the morale of the troops 
of VIII Corps was severely tested throughout the Gallipoli campaign, as a rash of 
short-lived ‘panics’ demonstrated. There was a distinct downturn in August 1915, 
which was marked by an increase in rates of sickness and self-inflicted wounds, 
and a ‘strike’, when a sub-unit simply refused to carry out an attack. Despite this, 
there was no general and permanent breakdown of morale, in the sense of 
unwillingness to obey the orders of higher command. VIII Corps’ morale was 
characterised by stoicism and resilience in the face of adverse conditions.  
 
Introduction 
The boys in our lot who were in Egypt and have been here since May are all 
pretty well fed up and worn out, which is only natural as they have been 
through it and do need a long rest.1  
 
                                                     
* Prof Gary Sheffield is Professor of War Studies in the School of Social, Historical and 
Political Studies at the University of Wolverhampton, UK 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v5i1.822 
1 Lee to mother, 4 Sept. 1915, in Robert Lee, Letters from Gallipoli (Kibworth 
Beauchamp: Matador, 2015), p. 45. 
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So wrote Private Bert Lee on 4 September 1915. Lee had arrived on Gallipoli as a 
reinforcement for 1/7 Manchesters, a Territorial battalion of 42nd (East Lancashire) 
Division. The Division had landed at Cape Helles in early May, after training in Egypt, 
and since then had been engaged in trench warfare, under small arms and shell fire, 
whether holding positions, or attacking, virtually without respite. This, plus a 
monotonous diet and endemic sickness, had reduced the 1/7 Manchesters to the state 
that Lee described. Similarly, a member of the 42nd Division Royal Engineers contrasted 
the appearance of yeomanry troops who arrived at Gallipoli in October 1915 ‘in the 
pink of condition’, with ‘our war-worn men, sick from every ailment imaginable’.2  
 
This article explores the state of morale among troops of British VIII Corps at 
Gallipoli.3 It makes use of Anthony King’s recent work on combat motivation in 
infantry platoons.4 King builds upon earlier attempts to explain combat performance. 
Seminal works privileged the primary group as the mainspring of combat motivation.5 
Essentially, it was argued that men fought because they did not want to let down other 
group members, and feared being seen as ‘unmanly’. Indeed, interpersonal masculine 
bonds were seen as the centre of cohesion, and hence combat motivation. 
Alternatively, the role of ideology and punishment in combat performance has also 
been stressed; moreover, the goal of the cohesive group could be to avoid combat 
and thus enhance its chance of survival.6 
 
In recent years, scholars have moved away from being concerned with what soldiers 
feel to what they collectively do. Hew Strachan has persuasively argued that ‘when 
exhaustion makes rational thought impossible, or when fear has taken over’ properly-
trained ‘individuals react without thinking’. It could even be argued that interpersonal 
relations are immaterial, providing that combat teams ‘have trained together 
                                                     
2 ‘Compiled by members of the Corps’, A History of the East Lancashire Royal Engineers 
(Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, nd [1920]), p. 109.  
3 For the order of battle of VIII Corps, see Appendix.  
4 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 17-
19, 38. 
5 King, Combat Soldier, pp. 13-15, 98-99; Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, 
‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II’,  The Public Opinion 
Quarterly (12, 2, 1948), pp. 280-315; S.A. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier, Vol. II, 
Combat and its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949); Roger 
Little, ‘Buddy Relations and Combat Performance’, in Morris Janowitz, The New 
Military: Changing Patterns of Organization (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1969 [1964] 
pp. 195-223. 
6 Charles Moskos, The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970); Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1985) pp. 31, 317-18; Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).  
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sufficiently’.7 Sweeping explanations of combat motivation, such as the primary group 
or ideology, are now less favoured than ‘the specific social dynamics on the battlefield 
or within military units’. King is influenced by the sociologist Randall Collins, who 
argues that to commit violence is hard, not easy; to paraphrase him, habitual violence 
is a ‘learned microtechnique’.8 While not rejecting the significance of the primary 
group, appeals to masculinity, or ideology, King’s work stresses the social dynamics of 
the platoon in creating cohesion. 
 
Central to King’s thesis is his rehabilitation of the work of S.L.A. Marshall. The latter’s 
thesis, based on his study of US troops in Second World War, was that on the 
twentieth century ‘empty battlefield’ only around 1-in-4 of infantrymen fired their 
weapons. By contrast, crew-served weapons enjoyed the benefits of visible team work 
and could keep up high rates of fire.9 Marshall’s thesis and methodology have been 
attacked.10 King partially accepts these criticisms but offers some evidence that 
supports Marshall’s ideas, contending that in general, the mass armies of non-
professional soldiers of 1914-18 and 1939-45 were too large to be trained effectively. 
Thus ‘low levels’ of combat effectiveness ‘were… the norm in the citizen platoon’ in 
Western armies of the period. Left to themselves, soldiers tended to passivity.11 King, 
in part revisiting earlier theories of motivation, argues that this ‘Marshall Effect’ could 
be overcome in a variety of ways: appeals to masculinity and patriotism; ideological 
indoctrination; mass tactics, especially the bayonet charge; training soldiers for 
‘extreme aggression’; and relying on heroic, often self-sacrificing, individual leaders to 
motivate the rest.12  
                                                     
7 Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale, and Modern War’, Journal of Contemporary History 
(41, 2, 2006), p. 217; Anthony King, ‘On Cohesion’, in Anthony King (ed.), Frontline: 
Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), p. 11. 
8 Randall Collins, ‘The micro-sociology of violence’, British Journal of Sociology (60, 3, 
2009), p. 575. See also idem, Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). 
9 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War 
(Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1978 [1947]), pp. 41-42, 44, 50; King, Combat Soldier, 
pp. 42-61.  
10 Roger J. Spiller, ‘S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire’, Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institute, 133, Dec. 1988, pp. 63-71; John Whiteclay Chambers II, ‘S.L.A. 
Marshall’s Men Against Fire: new evidence regarding fire ratios’, Parameters 33 (Autumn 
1993), pp. 113-21; Robert Engen, Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the 
Second World War (Montreal and Kington: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 19-
22, 146-9.  
11 King, Combat Soldier, pp. 51-8, 60 (quote from p. 51). King’s thesis is twenty-first 
century professional forces have largely overcome the problem through training. 
12 King, Combat Soldier, passim. 
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VIII Corps at Gallipoli represents a good ‘laboratory’ in which to test King’s ideas. This 
formation served in a discrete and geographically limited area (the Helles front at 
Gallipoli) from April 1915 to January 1916.13 Most of its constituent units and 
formations were poorly-trained citizen soldiers without previous combat experience, 
led by inexperienced officers. The main exception was 29th Division, which consisted 
almost entirely of Regular battalions. However, heavy casualties soon reduced the 
quality of these units, and the replacements that reached Gallipoli were often wartime 
volunteers. The conditions at Helles severely tested soldiers’ morale. The historical 
study of military morale and combat motivation is a dynamic field, to which scholars 
such as Jonathan Fennell, Jonathan Boff, Alexander Watson and Tarak Barkawi have 
recently made sophisticated and intellectually exciting contributions.14 This article 
employs a simple but robust working definition of ‘morale’: it is a state of mind that 
determines the attitude of soldiers, individually and collectively, towards their 
situation, especially their willingness to obey orders and endure. ‘Combat motivation’ 
refers to a subset of more general morale, that is, willingness to engage in offensive 
action.15 Clausewitz differentiated between ‘mood’ and ‘spirit’. The former is transient 
and dependent on factors such as the weather; the latter concerns essential willingness 
to endure and to fight.16 This article argues that for the most part, the spirit of British 
soldiers at Helles was, from the perspective of higher command, sound, although 
mood fluctuated according to circumstances.  
 
                                                     
13 Technically, VIII Corps was formed in June 1915 from formations that had landed at 
Helles from 25 April 1915 onwards.  
14Jonathan Fennell, ‘Re-evaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The 
Northwest Europe Campaign of the Second World War’, in Anthony King (ed.), 
Frontline: Combat and Cohesion In The Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), pp. 134-66; Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The 
British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse 
in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
15 These definitions represent a development of the arguments first made in G.D. 
Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the 
British Army in the Era of the First World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000) pp. 180-1. 
Fennell’s definition of morale is similar: Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The 
British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2019), p. 708.  
16 Carl von Clausewitz (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), On 
War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 189.  
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The basic factors that influenced British soldiers’ morale in the Great War have been 
examined by the author elsewhere.17 These factors, such as the importance of mail 
from home,18 held true for Gallipoli, but a soldier’s reminiscence of ‘Those parched 
days when… we would have willingly given a week’s pay for a cooling draught of “Bass” 
[beer]’ hints at the particularly extreme conditions endured by men there.19 Sleep was 
an unusually precious commodity, and given the medical effects of sleep deprivation, 
this would have made soldiers’ morale especially fragile.20 Moreover, there were also 
some very specific factors. Thus, in May 1915, the withdrawal of battleships from close 
support depressed soldiers’ morale.21  
 
For more than 50 years prior to the First World War, the Volunteer (from 1908, 
Territorial) drill hall had taken its place alongside the pub, chapel and sports team as 
a mainstay of local loyalties. The two Territorial Force (TF) divisions that served at 
Helles, 42nd (East Lancashire) and 52nd (Lowland), came from this tradition. Not all the 
men who went overseas with TF units had pre-war Territorial service, or were even 
local men.22 However, there was substantial continuity between the peacetime TF 
units and those serving at Helles. Such connections undoubtedly enhanced unit 
cohesion, but the effect of heavy casualties on such close-knit units could be damaging 
to both military and civilian morale. Mike Horgan, who arrived on Gallipoli in August 
1915 as a reinforcement for 1/7 Manchesters, found that ‘a lot of my pals that I was 
looking for were already dead’.23 In Galasheils, the news of the appalling losses suffered 
                                                     
17 Gary Sheffield, Command and Morale: The British Army on the Western Front 1914-
1918 (Barnsley: Praetorian Press, 2014) pp. 153-71. 
18 A.H. Mure, This Bloody Place: With the Incomparable 29th (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 
2015 [1919]), pp. 40-1. 
19 Border Regiment Archives, Cumbria’s Museum of Military Life (BRA/CMML), 
‘S.W.E’, ‘Do You Remember? Some Recollections of Gallipoli, 1915’, Borders News 
Sheet, I, (1 Apr. 1929), n.p. See also Gary Sheffield, ‘Shaping British and Anzac Soldiers’ 
Experience of Gallipoli: Environmental and Medical Factors, and the Development of 
Trench Warfare’, in British Journal of Military History (BJMH) (4, 1, 2017). 
20 See below, and June J. Pilcher and Allen I. Huffcutt, ‘Effects of Sleep Deprivation on 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis’, in Sleep, (19, 4, Jun 1996) 
21 Diary, 24 May 1915, in John Gilliam, Gallipoli Diary (Stevenage: Strong Oak/Donovan, 
1989 [1918]), p. 100. 
22 K.W. Mitchinson, The Territorial Force at War, 1914-16 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 
pp. 6, 62. For the context of army recruitment in 1914-15, see Peter Simkins, 
Kitchener’s Armies: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988) and Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to 
the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014 [2012]). 
23 Transcript of interview, in Sue Richardson (ed.), The recollections of three Manchesters 
in the Great War (privately published, 2006), pp. 32-33.  
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by 1/4 King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) on 12 July 1915 led to women ‘openly 
weeping… “It is just like Flodden over again”’.24 In modern memory, 1 July 1916, the 
First Day on the Somme, was the first occasion in which locally-raised battalions and 
their parent communities suffered huge losses. In reality, in the previous summer 
towns in Scotland and Lancashire were grieving over mass casualties.   
 
Casualties  
Casualties at Gallipoli were extremely heavy. Losses in 86 Brigade during the landing 
were such that 1/Royal Dublin Fusiliers and 1/Royal Munster Fusiliers had to be 
temporarily amalgamated as the ‘Dubsters’.25 Costly offensives followed, but losses 
during periods of trench-holding were also high, as were sickness rates. 1/5 
Manchesters first went into the trenches on 11 May. In three months, of the 832 men 
who landed on Gallipoli in May (including 35 officers) 582, about 70 per cent, had 
become battle casualties or were sick.26 Loss rates were exacerbated by problems in 
sending reinforcements to Gallipoli, meaning that units were invariably understrength, 
sometimes severely so.27 Moreover, the quality of some drafts caused concern: Major-
General Paris (General Officer Commanding [GOC] Royal Naval Division [RND]) 
complained of being sent ‘“War Babies”’.28 Inevitably, heavy losses had an impact on 
combat effectiveness. After the fighting on 28 April Brigadier-General William Marshall 
(temporarily commanding 29th Division) signalled that ‘both regiments and brigades 
are much mixed and thoroughly done’. The combination of strong Ottoman 
resistance, the breakdown of the advance, and doubtless the cumulative effect of the 
heavy losses incurred since 25 April meant that 29th Division was temporarily combat 
ineffective. Even in early June, the new GOC of 29th Division found it weak and in 
disarray.29 Similarly, on 7 June Major-General Paris signalled that, after intense combat 
                                                     
24 Quoted in Gavin Richardson, For King, Country and the Scottish Borderers (privately 
published, 1987), p. 58; see also Ian S. Wood, ‘“Be Strong and of a Good Courage”: 
The Royal Scots’ Territorial Battalions from 1908 to Gallipoli’, in C.M.M. Macdonald 
and E.W. McFarland, (eds.), Scotland and the Great War (Edinburgh: Tuckwell, 1999), 
pp. 115-16. 
25 Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, Hume papers, Ms account of 86 Infantry 
Brigade, 30 April 1915. 
26 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London [LHCMA/KCL], 
Darlington papers, 3 September 1915. 
27 The UK National Archives (TNA), CAB 19/33, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry 
Sclater, evidence to Dardanelles Commission, 1917. 
28 Imperial War Museum [IWM], DS/Misc/57 reel 1, Paris Papers, Paris to Christine, 
25 August 1915. See also Brigadier-General D. Mercer diary, (in private hands), 20, 24 
August 1915.  
29 TNA, WO 95/4304, War Diary [WD], 29th Division General Staff [GS], 28 Apr. 
1915; LHCMA/KCL, Lieutenant-General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle papers, ‘My narrative of 
the Great German War’, p. 75. 
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three days earlier, ‘The [RND’s] 1st Brigade are very exhausted. The 2nd Brigade is not 
for the moment effective’.30 Even successes were expensive. 42nd Division did well in 
its attack of 4 June, but on the 26th Lieutenant-General Sir Alymer Hunter-Weston 
(GOC VIII Corps) reported that ‘42nd Division with the exception of the 127th 
Manchester Brigade (now very weak) are not at present of any great fighting value’.31 
 
The Marshall Effect 
There is some evidence from Helles that supports the notion of the Marshall Effect, 
in the sense of passivity of troops. In mid-May, a ‘Special Order’ was issued to 29th 
Division: 
 
It must be a point of honour for all that each day there is some advance to 
record, some Turks killed, or some important point in their line captured, or 
rendered so dangerous that they will cease to make use of it.32 
  
Clearly, higher command feared inaction, the context being the heavy casualties 
suffered since 25 April. Generals continued to be worried by passivity throughout the 
campaign.33 Moreover, in September 1915, Hunter-Weston’s successor, Lieutenant-
General Sir F.J. ‘Joey’ Davies, wanted to reduce the number of men holding trenches, 
in line with Western Front practice. The commanders of 42nd and 52nd Territorial 
divisions opposed the plan, arguing that their ranks contained many ‘young soldiers 
and that numbers were necessary to give them confidence’.34 Clearly, these generals 
understood the ‘empty battlefield’ phenomenon.  
 
Evidence of troops failing to fire their weapons is scarce, but one incident is suggestive. 
Brigadier-General D.G. Prendergast, (126 Brigade, 42nd Division) found two men in 
the trenches who did not ‘know how to load their rifles. This is an extreme case no 
doubt, but [he found] men and officers I consider mere recruits, unfit for the firing 
line’.35 Against this must be set evidence of ‘funk fire’, when raw, jumpy soldiers 
                                                     
30 TNA, WO 95/4290, WD, Royal Naval Division GS, Paris to HQ VIII Corps, 7 June 
1915. 
31 C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol. II (London: Heinemann, 
1932), p. 51; TNA, CAB 19/29, Lieutenant-Colonel A.E.F. Fawcus, evidence to 
Dardanelles Commission, 1917; TNA, WO 95/4273, GS VIII Corps, Hunter-Weston 
to Braithwaite, 26/6/15. 
32 TNA, WO 95/4304, WD, 29th Division GS, 15 May 1915. 
33 See e.g. TNA, WO 95/4273, WD, VIII Corps General Staff [GS], Minutes of Corps 
Commander’s Conference 30 September 1915.  
34 TNA, WO 95/4273, VIII Corps General Staff [GS], Minutes of Corps Commander’s 
Conference. 14 September 1915.  
35 TNA, CAB 19/30, Brigadier-General D.G. Prendergast, evidence to Dardanelles 
Commission, 1916. 
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continually fired their rifles, especially at night. Here the problem was stopping men 
from wasting ammunition by blazing away at shadows. Experienced soldiers learned 
not to do this.36 
 
One aspect of the Marshall Effect that certainly applied at Gallipoli was the role of 
individual leaders in overcoming passivity among troops. This is perhaps reflected in 
the high number of officer casualties relative to those of Other Ranks. Lieutenant-
Colonel H.C. Darlington, commanding officer (CO) of 1/5 Manchesters, wrote in early 
June that ‘Authorities’ had ordered that COs were not allowed to lead their men into 
battle. COs ‘should be in the rear of their commands where they can watch and 
influence events and keep in touch with their commands and with Brigade’. This 
managerial approach clashed with the instincts of many COs, including Darlington’s. 
COs were often officers of a lower rank than lieutenant-colonel, temporarily holding 
the post because the original commander had become a casualty, and such men may 
have had difficulty restraining their desire to lead from the front.37 Pace the stereotype 
of the chateau general, senior officers on occasion exercised battlefield leadership. 
Brigadier-General William Scott-Moncrieff, GOC 156 Brigade (52nd Division) was 
killed on 28 June in the ‘front line where he had no business to be’ while ‘pushing 
forward’ a ‘sticky’ battalion (1/7 Cameronians).38 During First Krithia (28 April) the 
conduct of Brigadier-General Marshall, was described as ‘magnificent[,] walking about 
the whole day under a heavy fire pushing men on’.39  
 
However, regimental officers shouldered the main burden of battlefield leadership. An 
almost textbook example of the Marshall Effect occurred during Third Krithia (4 June 
1915). The RND suffered appalling losses during their advance, with many officers 
being killed or wounded. Eventually, the ‘whole line [was]... forced back to its original 
position with very heavy loss’.40 Sub-Lieutenant F.S. Kelly (Hood Battalion), 
commanding a force in the British front line, was unaware of what had happened to 
the assaulting waves until ‘there was rather an alarming rush back to our trench of 
                                                     
36 H. Maldwyn Davies, A Flintshire Territorial at War 1914-18 (Worthenbury: Bridge 
Books, 2016) p. 47; KCL, Darlington Papers 18 July 1915; Royal Marines archives, 
1975/b, John Allen, diary, 23 July 1915. 
37 LHCMA/KCL, Darlington Papers, letter, 18 July 1915. 
38 TNA, CAB45/249, Major-General G.G. Egerton diary, 28 June 1915; Frank Davies 
and Graham Maddocks, Bloody Red Tabs: General Officer Casualties of the Great War 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1995) p. 103; but see also R.R. Thompson, The Fifty-Second 
(Lowland) Division 1914-1918 (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson & Co, 1923), pp. 60-61.  
39 Lucas to Mother, 29 Apr 1915, 
http://gallipolifirstandlast.blogspot.co.uk/?view=timeslide (emphasis added), viewed 19 
June 2019. 
40 TNA, WO 95/4290, WD, Royal Naval Division GS, Paris to HQ VIII Corps, 6 June 
1915. 
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panic-stricken Collingwood and Anson men’. He went out into No Man’s Land to 
attempt to halt the rout: ‘I turned a few of them about, but there were too many of 
them for me to cope with’. Kelly then spent 45 minutes ‘going up and down the trench 
pushing them out again’, ordering them to ‘report themselves to any officer they found 
in front of the line’. About 30 men went ‘over the parapet’, but Kelly discovered that 
most of them were ‘merely lying down a few yards from the trench. Kelly then led the 
men towards Ottoman trenches. Once he had ‘got them moving’, Kelly returned to 
his own men, but he was wounded. Later he heard that casualties among the officers 
of the assaulting battalions had been heavy, so that ‘the men were leaderless and didn’t 
know what to do’.41  
 
This incident reveals a number of facets of the Marshall Effect. The initial attack broke 
down because of the intensity of enemy fire, which resulted in the loss of leaders. The 
brigade commander, Commodore Oliver Backhouse, subsequently reported that four 
key officers were killed ‘early in the advance’, and their loss seems to have had a 
disproportionate effect on the cohesion of the assaulting troops.42 Deprived of leaders, 
panic set in amongst poorly-trained troops that lacked initiative, but the rout subsided 
once the men had reached the RND’s trench. Eventually, Kelly’s heroic and 
charismatic leadership did succeed in leading some men back towards the battle. This 
was not the only time when individual leadership compensated for lack of training, 
discipline and combat motivation.43  
 
At the heart of King’s work is the distinctive problem of combat performance and the 
citizen force. This was reflected in a comment by a wartime volunteer, Joe Murray 
(Hood Battalion, RND), on the Regular 2/Hampshires: ‘Their advance under such 
terrible fire was an object lesson to we ‘civilian’ soldiers and the value of training was 
brought home to us during those glorious minutes’.44 Such admiration of the 
professionalism of the Regulars among citizen-soldiers was not uncommon. A middle-
class Territorial, Corporal Cyril Barnes (1/5 Manchesters), commented that ‘The 
average soldier might be a rather coarse & vulgar chap, but when it comes to doing 
                                                     
41 Kelly, diary, 4 Jun 1915, in Jon Cooksey and Graham McKechnie (eds.), The Lost 
Olympian of the Somme (London: Blink, 2016 [2015]), p. 106. For context, see TNA, 
WO 95/4290, WD, RND GS, 4 June 1915. 
42 TNA, WO 95/4290, WD, RND GS, ‘Report on the Operations of 2nd Brigade’, 5 
June 1915; Douglas Jerrold, The Royal Naval Division (London: Hutchinson, 1927), p. 
135. 
43 For an example, see Kelly, diary, 4 Jun 1915, in Cooksey and McKechnie, Lost 
Olympian, p. 121; Lister to Ribblesdale, 22 Jul. 1915, in Lord Ribblesdale, Charles Lister 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917), p. 211. 
44 Joseph Murray, diary, 2 May 1915, in Gallipoli 1915 (London: New English Library, 
1977 [1965]), p. 66. 
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his duty he is a perfect ‘brick’.45 However, the discipline and training of even 
inexperienced citizen-volunteers could be effective. Coming under fire for the first 
time at Suvla Bay on 6 August 1915, a soldier noted that ‘the discipline stood to us 
(sic) marvellously; we seemed to do the right thing at the right time mechanically, for 
you must remember that we were more or less stupefied’.46 
 
Mass tactics, in the form of bayonet charges, were certainly used to overcome inertia. 
On 28 April Captain Ellis of 1/Borders (29th Division) led his exhausted men in an 
advance until they were held up by Ottoman fire. They were faced with: 
 
an open bit [of ground] of nearly 200 [yards] literally swept by lead and the only 
way I could devise of bringing the men up to scratch was to fix bayonets and 
take them across at the charge. 
 
For these bone-weary men, the crowd morale of a bayonet charge overcame their 
hesitation.47 Use of the bayonet charge was allied to the cultivation of extreme 
aggression in the men, something discouraged by modern professional armies. Such 
bloodlust could lead to situations such as when 1/5 Manchesters avenged ‘the ill-
treatment of our men by shooting or bayonetting everyone, & only taking prisoners 
when the officer was there’.48 
 
Panics 
Short-lived ‘panic[s]’ among troops in the front line, wrote Major-General G.G. 
Egerton, GOC 52nd (Lowland) Division, ‘are common in every way’.49 Hunter-Weston 
concurred. 50 As far as the Gallipoli campaign was concerned, Egerton was right. His 
comments were prompted by the events of 13 July 1915. 52nd Division had attacked 
and taken Ottoman trenches on the previous day, sustaining severe casualties in the 
process. The right flank of the one of the battalions holding the newly captured trench, 
1/7 Highland Light Infantry [HLI], was enfiladed by sniping, bombing and machine gun 
fire. The paucity of men available, and the particularly ghastly conditions in the trench, 
                                                     
45 Manchester Regiment Archives, Tameside Local Studies and Archives Centre 
(MRA/TLSAC), MR3/16/56, Barnes to Flo, 16 May 1915. 
46 Royal Dublin Fusiliers Archive, Dublin City Library, RDFA/018/018/1/3, TS Diary of 
Cecil and Douglas Gunning, 3 Jan 1916. 
47 BRA/CMML, ‘Peninsular Press & Ellis’ file, Ellis to wife (ts), 5 May 1915. 
48 MRA/TLSAC, MR3/16/56, Barnes to Jessie, 13 June 1915. For the importance of the 
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especially the stench of corpses, which caused men to vomit, meant that ‘only a very 
primitive consolidation could be made during the night’.51  
 
In the early hours of the following day, ‘a small trickle of troops, which rapidly became 
a torrent, poured out from the trenches held by the right of the 157th Brigade and 
rushed back to the old British line’. A handful of officers succeeded in rallying the men 
and stabilising the situation, leading them back to the captured Ottoman trenches. 
While the proximate cause of the rout was an order to reduce to ‘draw in the exposed 
right flank’, which was misunderstood as an instruction to retire, the Official Historian 
concisely summarised the underlying reason for the rout began by 1/7 HLI: ‘Many of 
the men, parched with thirst and utterly fatigued by their first day of active operations, 
were nearing the end of their tether’.52 157 Brigade HQ reported that at dusk ‘a 
number of men left the firing line saying that they had been sent back for water etc.’53 
Thus even before the panic set in, soldiers were finding excuses to leave the front line. 
The rout drew in nearby troops. Men of 1/5 HLI ‘were caught up in the rush of men’ 
from their right flank and ‘some confusion ensued’. Some of 157 Brigade stood their 
ground, however, while an officer of 1/5 HLI led a reserve company forward to the 
abandoned trench. On their own initiative, a machine gun team consisting of six 
privates of 1/7 Royal Scots brought their weapon into the front line to support 1/7 
HLI. RND officers also intervened to rally men of the Lowland Division.54  
 
After the war, Egerton admitted that the incident was an ‘undoubted panic’, but it was 
sorted out ‘within the hour’. Other sources also indicate that the problem was of 
short duration - the Divisional history stated that the first group of rallied men were 
back in the trenches ‘within five minutes of the retirement’, the crisis being effectively 
over within 30 minutes. The panic had operational, not merely local, significance: a 
garbled and exaggerated report reached Hunter-Weston at VIII Corps, leading him to 
order a fresh attack.55 It also undoubtedly reinforced suspicion in the minds of higher 
command about the reliability of Territorial soldiers and units.56 
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In terms of the Marshall Effect, this incident demonstrates the problem of sending into 
the attack untried and poorly-trained soldiers, commanded by officers and NCOs, 
most of whom were no better off, and the importance of individual leadership in 
rallying the men. It shows that high commanders’ distrust of Territorials was not 
entirely unreasonable; these raw ‘Terriers’ simply lacked the resilience of veterans.57 
However, this panic also suggests that while the morale of these Territorials may have 
been brittle, it was fundamentally sound. Most men did not rout beyond their own 
front line. They were halted and quickly brought back into action, and they 
subsequently held the line until relieved.  An eye-witness stated that he saw ‘no sign 
of panic… They came back at a jog-trot as if they were carrying out a retiral (sic) on 
a field-day’. The Divisional historian stated that officers, NCOs and even some privates 
rallied the routing troops ‘without difficulty… the moment they were told to do so’. 
The exception was ‘always in such cases’ - suggesting that the situation was not 
uncommon -  the ‘few nerve-shattered men who were stopped with difficulty’.  In 
Clausewitzian terms, it was an example of how the mood of soldiers could change 
rapidly. However, this incident triggered another, and potentially more serious crisis. 
The WD of 1/5 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders recorded that ‘This retiral spread 
to the rear of the Bde (sic) and almost became a panic. Fugitives began to stream… 
past our HQ and there was some difficulty in stopping the rush and getting them to 
return to their units’.58 
 
Another account of a panic also testified to its short-lived nature. In the early hours 
of 29 May the appearance of some Gurkhas in No Man’s Land triggered panic among 
some men of 1/Royal Munster Fusiliers, who mistaking  them for enemy troops, rushed 
back from the frontline trench.  Second Lieutenant Laidlaw by his own account briefly 
panicked but recovered his nerve, and ‘pricking’ a few men with a bayonet he shouted 
for them to rally: 
 
[but] as quickly as it had started, the panic died down and the men returned and 
jumped back into the trench. They were thoroughly ashamed of themselves and 
nothing would have moved them after that. Although most of them had only 
gone a few yards’.59 
 
This basic pattern occurred in a number of examples of panics. Soldiers’ nerves broke; 
they ran back, but were quickly rallied by leaders, who sometimes threatened to shoot 
panicking soldiers.60 Major A.H. Mure (1/5 Royal Scots) was one such leader. The 
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language he used to describe the incident in May 1915 was suggestive, combined 
masculinity and patriotic ideology: the men were ‘unmanned but for a moment… 
[then] went over the top again like true Britons’.61 On 6 June, 19-year-old Second 
Lieutenant G.D.R. Moor of 2/Hampshires actually shot British soldiers to stem a rout, 
then leading men in a counterattack which retook a lost position. This action earned 
Moor the Victoria Cross.62  All this is evidence that while the mood of soldiers of VIII 
Corps was volatile, their spirit – their essential willingness to endure and engage in 
combat – remained fundamentally sound.  
 
The August Morale Crisis  
A 42nd Division sapper argued that until the failure of the August offensive, ‘all believed 
that we were winning, and it was just a matter of time until Achi Baba fell’.63 Likewise, 
an officer of 1/7 Manchesters thought the failure of the August offensive dashed hopes, 
‘and the whole aspect of the men… changed. They were sick in mind and in body, and 
fatigue was incessant’.  In reality, sickness was endemic in VIII Corps long before then 
as were other factors that mentioned as undermining morale: constant enemy fire, the 
heat, the flies, and the appalling stench. The brutal ending of any hope that the 
campaign could be brought won severely damaged the morale of the men, undermining 
their willingness to tolerate hardships for the sake of eventual military success.64 42nd 
Division’s heavy losses in diversionary actions in support of the August offensive were 
not irrelevant. 65 An RND officer made much the same case, arguing that in September 
and October, sickness rates - always a good indicator of the state of morale - were 
such that ‘the war-weary divisions at Cape Helles melted like snow in the noon-day 
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sun’.66 The figures for 52nd Division support his assertion, and show that the problem 
actually grew worse in November, peaking in mid-December.67 At the end of the year, 
the numbers of sick and wounded were more than twice as great as at the beginning 
of September.  
 
 
Week ending Officers Other Ranks  Total 
6 September 1915 66 1493 1559 
26 September 1915 82 2037 2119 
17 October 1915 103 2726 2865 
31 October 1915 105 3108 3212 
14 November 1915 104 3219  3323 
28 November 1915 126 3261 3387 
19 December 1915 126 3248 3374 
26 December 1915 107 3056 3163 
Source: Thompson, Fifty-Second Division, pp. 146, 176. 
 
Table 1. Sick and wounded in hospital and remaining on strength of 52nd (Lowland) Division. 
An unknown additional number were evacuated to UK and are not included in these totals.   
 
In mid-September, the VIII Corps Deputy Director of Medical Services (DDMS) stated 
that ‘There is throughout the troops a general feeling of lassitude and depression 
which lowers the power of resistance [to disease]’. However he stated that this 
phenomenon had been worse previously, which suggests that it had peaked, and he 
expected the measures intended to boost morale that the new Corps commander 
was introducing (see below) to make a positive difference.68  
 
This shift in attitudes was well understood by senior officers. In mid-September, 
Egerton visited 52nd Division’s trenches to find the men ‘looked very haggard and worn 
and tired… I told them we were all pretty well fed-up, but we had got to stick it’.69 
The cohesion of some RND units was under stress even before the failure of the 
August offensive. The amalgamation of battalions in June, brought about because of 
heavy losses, caused ‘grave discontent’.70 On 2 August some Royal Naval Volunteer 
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Reserve men of Hood Battalion, including eight Petty Officers, issued a petition 
demanding to be sent to sea, as 140 stokers had been previously. These men were 
only too willing to leave the Battalion, and thus Gallipoli. This challenged the beliefs of 
some officers about the cohesiveness of their unit. By early September, Hood officers 
were ‘depressed’ and angry with high command, not least because of the burdens 
placed on ‘the rank and file’.71  
 
Discipline is a useful another useful litmus test of morale.72 At the end of May, the 
Deputy Judge Advocate General (DJAG) reported that ‘considering the inevitable 
confusion and difficulties attaching to this month’s work, crimes were remarkably few’. 
A month later, he noted there was still relatively little crime on the peninsula, with 
‘few serious cases’. In July, there were fewer Field General Courts Martial (77) than 
there had been in June (91), although the force was, at least notionally, larger.73 Various 
factors help to explain this including the unattractiveness of deserting to the enemy, 
and the paucity of places for absentees to hide behind the British lines (although a few 
reached the beaches). There is little evidence of exceptional levels of minor 
misdemeanours dealt with at unit level, although this would repay further research.  
 
The strain on the soldiery of the peculiarly testing conditions at Gallipoli prompted a 
degree of leniency by high command. By the end of May, General Sir Ian Hamilton 
(GOC Mediterranean Expeditionary Force [MEF]) had commuted all eight death 
sentences awarded for ‘cowardice’, ‘taking into his consideration the hardships that 
the men had undergone’. On 21 May brigadiers were empowered to remit suspended 
sentences.74 At the end of July, the DJAG reported that the ‘policy of suspending 
sentences whenever possible’ had produced ‘excellent results’. Of 72 cases, only a 
handful of offenders ‘seriously misused the leniency shown’, although one was 
executed as a consequence. Moreover, from 25 July, Field Punishment No.1, the 
notorious ‘crucifixion’ whereby offenders were tied to a fixed object for set amounts 
of time, was forbidden on Gallipoli. Corps commanders had agreed that because of 
the fact that it exposed the men to undue punishment, there being practically no 
situation on the Peninsula secure from shell fire, it was held that such a punishment 
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was too severe, as well as being unfair to the men’.75 That such a decision was taken 
speaks volumes about the extreme nature of everyday life on Gallipoli.  
 
When ‘Joey’ Davies took command of VIII Corps on 5 August he judged that the 
morale of the TF formations and RND ‘was indifferent. The men were worn out by 
fighting, by the heat and by the constant fatigues.’ Having recently commanded on the 
Western Front, Davies was unhappy with the laxer approach to discipline he found at 
Helles; there was little saluting, for example, but there was a recognition that it was 
impractical to make Field Punishment more severe for Territorials ‘under present 
conditions’. His twin-track approach was to tighten discipline and order ‘minor 
operations’ to ‘encourage the spirit of keen offensive in the men’, while taking 
measures to improve morale.76 
 
From almost the beginning of the campaign, ‘[o]wing to the difficulties of obtaining rest 
and sleep’ men falling asleep on duty had posed a disciplinary problem for the MEF. In 
July ‘frequent’ cases of ‘men sleeping on post’ were in ‘nearly every case… directly 
due to exhaustion of the men’.77 A major factor was the weakness of units, ravaged by 
battle casualties and sickness. 1/4 KOSB, nominally about 1,000 strong, on 13 
September consisted of only 230 men, many of whom were sick, of which 
approximately 150 were holding the trenches – a task that included ‘daily digging 
fatigues’. The rest were used for the exhausting task of carrying food and water to the 
front line. Such shortage of manpower increased the burden on the men in the 
trenches; sentries ‘fell asleep… on the fire-step once relieved’.78 The unwelcome 
attention of flies made it difficult to sleep during the daytime.79 Cooler weather in early 
winter led to a diminution in the number of flies, and soldiers’ health improved 
accordingly.80  
 
The problem of exhaustion grew worse from August onwards. A battalion commander 
of 42nd Division believed that in September 1915 courts martial, which were ‘very 
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frequent at Helles’, were ‘almost exclusively for sleeping on sentry duty’. Officers had 
to try to keep their men awake in the front line at night. In ‘practically in every case’ 
the problem was of ‘sheer physical exhaustion’. 42nd Division was ‘physically incapable 
of carrying out effective military operations’.81 Captain Percy, who became DJAG in 
September 1915, noted the ‘very large proportion’ of cases of ‘sleeping on post’. This 
was the consequence of ‘excessive periods of duty’ and ‘the want of frequent reliefs’, 
and Percy believed that failures of organisation at regimental level was partly 
responsible.82 
 
Even more striking evidence of morale problems was the rise in the incidence of self-
inflicted wounds (SIW). Egerton noted this in 52nd Division in September (‘men 
shooting themselves in finger or foot’). Percy also noted the significant increase in 
SIW, and that most men evacuated from Gallipoli never returned. ‘The temptation is 
therefore greater in this force than in France [where men recovered from wounds 
often returned], and the benefits to be gained… more easily achieved’.83 Percy’s 
concerns were reflected in a GHQ memorandum of early November that ordered 
that all ranks were to be informed that no one suspected or convicted of ‘self maiming’ 
would be evacuated from Gallipoli, except ‘extreme’ cases, who would be sent to 
Mudros.84  
 
Lieutenant-General Davies had a very practical approach to improving morale. He 
sought to improve leisure facilities, for instance by providing refreshments, raising 
bands from personnel of each division, and by staging sports matches. Greek labourers 
were brought into relieve soldiers of some ‘heavy’ fatigues. Clothes were to be 
regularly disinfected.85 Further work is needed to assess how far Davies’s plans were 
realised, but some certainly were. Two snapshots of his efforts are of Hood and Anson 
teams playing football in the RND final of the ‘Dardanelles Cup’, and the 52nd Divisional 
Band’s rendition of The Mikado ‘interrupted’ by shelling.86 Davies believed that such 
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measures ensured that ‘moral improved and eventually became good’.87 The latter view 
is possibly too sanguine, but morale does seem to have improved from the nadir of 
mid-August.  
 
Combat Refusal88 
Perhaps the most striking occurrence of the Marshall Effect at Helles, and how under 
certain circumstances soldiers could have significant influence on their own fate, 
occurred in the early hours of hours of 16 August 1915 when a group of men carried 
out what amounted to a strike located in a military context; ‘collective bargaining in 
khaki’, in Julian Putkowski’s felicitous phrase.89 It is possibly significant that these 
particular strikers were citizen soldiers who had been civilians only months before, at 
least some of which would have been drawn from an industrial society in which trade 
unions played an important role.90  
 
1/6 Highland Light Infantry (52nd Division) began an attempt to capture trenches in the 
Vineyard sector.91 The plan was to use three waves of 30 men, with the waves being 
some 25 yards apart. At 0230 Lieutenant Wyllie climbed out of the frontline trench 
and ‘walked in a crawling position for about 25 yards without looking behind me’. A 
voice close by him then said ‘“Mr. Wylie, the men are not following you”’. Wyllie 
shouted, “Come on 6th” but reached the Ottoman trench he was ‘alone as far as I 
could see’. Second Lieutenant Glendenning similarly advanced 10 yards into No Man’s 
Land before realising that he was alone. A large majority of the men failed to follow 
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their officers; either declining to leave the trenches, or going only a short distance 
once they had gone over the top: Corporal Martin, who went 10-12 yards forward of 
the British position, saw ‘men moving back on their hands and knees’. Although some 
men did attack and engaged in some stiff fighting, at 0305 the battalion CO, Colonel 
Millar, was informed that the assault was a complete failure.  
 
Some witnesses to the subsequent Court of Enquiry speculated that the rum ration 
may not have been diluted. The system in the battalion was for a mess tin of rum to 
be sent along the line, with men placed on their honour not to have more than a 
mouthful. It is possible that some men, lacking the supervision more usual in the army 
during the distribution of rum, drank excessively and were emboldened by alcohol to 
defy orders. Whatever the case, the men of 1/6 HLI used a number of strategies to 
avoid making the attack. Some feigned wounds or sickness; and in the dark it would 
have been difficult to discover whether or not they were shamming. Some simply 
‘sneaked away’ in the darkness before the attack (one wave was reduced from a 
nominal 30 to only 24 men by various means). Several rankers claimed to have heard 
an order to retire. It is unclear whether this was an outright fabrication, or whether 
someone did indeed pass along this unauthorised instruction. Outright defiance was 
avoided in favour of evasion and malingering, and there seems to have been some 
coordination to thwart the attack. Colonel Millar blamed NCOs as well as the private 
soldiers for the failure of the assault, although at least some NCOs did attempt to 
carry put orders.  
 
These assault parties demonstrated a great deal of cohesion. Rather than this leading 
to positive combat motivation, this was an occasion when achieving the goals specified 
by military leadership was regarded as less important by the group than keeping that 
group intact.92 One of the major responsibilities of leaders is to ensure that group 
goals are congruent with those of higher command.93 1/6 HLI’s officers failed in this 
task. This failure began at the top. As recently as 2 August, Egerton had been doubtful 
about the Division’s combat effectiveness following its losses in mid-July, but twelve 
days later he evidently thought that 1/6 HLI at least had recovered sufficiently, so he 
chose it, his ‘best battalion’, for the operation. Although in 1914 Egerton had selected 
Millar for command, after the operation he described Millar as ‘greatly lacking in 
interest, energy, and initiative, throughout the whole affair’.94 Millar had failed to visit 
the front line that night, instead remaining in contact by telephone. He had also issued 
verbal rather than written orders and this led to confusion about when the advance 
was to commence. Egerton’s view was that Brigade’s orders were ‘not at fault’, but 
the operation was ‘ill-prepared regimentally’. Egerton criticised the ‘negative role’ of 
Captain C. Macfie, the Adjutant, but recognised that as Regular officer, Millar might 
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not have paid much attention to his Territorial subordinate; Macfie’s evidence hints at 
discord between the two men.95 
 
There were strong indications that all was not well with the men well before the attack 
was launched. Macfie testified that two soldiers ‘fainted when the order to attack was 
given, and that he saw three men in the barricades sobbing’. Glendenning realised that 
his platoon ‘did not seem very lively and [he] tried to cheer them up, telling them “we 
must see it through” and things of that sort’. Captain Daly, Officer Commanding C 
Company, ‘did not consider they [the men] were fit for the first attack as they were 
tired out’. The officers did not act upon these warnings. It would have been asking a 
great deal of junior officers to call off their part of an attack, but very occasionally a 
battalion commander would do so. The buck stopped with Millar. 
 
In retrospect, the malady was obvious. The battalion had not properly recovered from 
the heavy losses sustained in the fighting for Achi Baba Nullah on 12 July. The soldiers 
and most of the officers had been civilians just a few months before, and they were 
not members of an anonymous war-raised unit. On the contrary, 1/6 HLI was a 
community with deep roots in civil society of Scotland. Men were frightened and in 
mourning because of the recent catastrophic losses. As Egerton belated realised, these 
Territorials lacked the discipline and staying power of Regulars; or, one might add, 
veteran citizen troops.96 A  clearer example of the contingent nature of military 
obedience would be difficult to find. Inter-rank relations in the British army in the First 
World War were based on the exchange of deference in return for paternalistic 
leadership. If Other Ranks believed that their officers were in breach of the unwritten 
contract, they were perfectly capable of making their feelings known and taking action, 
up to and including large-scale mutiny.97 The men of the HLI’s behaviour in August 
1915 was technically an act of mutiny, but in reality it was a way of conveying to their 
officers that they were unwilling to obey orders that they considered unreasonable. It 
is important to note that there was no violence against the officers, nor did the 
discipline of the unit collapse on a permanent basis. Rather, it was a stark reminder to 
its commanders that the unit’s willingness to engage in combat could not be taken for 
granted.  
 
Davies condemned this combat refusal in an order that shamed their identity as Scots, 
and, implicitly, their masculinity.98 Egerton issued a memorandum to his officers 
criticising the tendency towards a live-and-let-live approach to the enemy, bluntly 
                                                     
95 TNA, CAB45/249, Egerton diary, 2, 16 August 1915. For the instructions from 
Brigade, see WO 95/4321, WD, 1/6 HLI August 1915, Appx 7, 15 August 1915.  
96 TNA, CAB45/249 Egerton diary, 16 August 1915.  
97 Sheffield, Leadership, pp. 70-71, 150-52.  
98 WO 95/4273, WD, VIII Corps, Davies to Egerton, 18 August 1915. 
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ordering aggressive action.99 This may have been a response to being warned by his 
three brigade commanders that while they believed their men would ‘repel’ an assault, 
they ‘would not like to make an attack’. Egerton was conflicted. He was sleeping badly, 
had nightmares, and was haunted by his Division’s losses. He did not mince words in 
speaking to his superiors, which probably contributed to him being sacked in mid-
September.100 By that time Egerton had come to share the doubts of his brigadiers as 
to whether his troops could be trusted on the offensive.101 52nd Division was not 
completely spared from being sent into battle, but in the short term it may have made 
higher commanders more cautious about using it.  
 
Concluding thoughts  
This article has demonstrated that Anthony King’s ‘Marshall Effect’ thesis, defined 
broadly, is a useful analytical tool when applied to VIII Corps at Helles. Although the 
men of 29th Division, at least in the early stages of the campaign, were a partial 
exception, the troops of the Corps were inexperienced, poorly trained and too often 
indifferently led. They were spooked by the empty battlefield and showed, from the 
perspective of higher command, worrying traits of inertia. King argues that officers 
attempted to overcome passivity by using mass assaults, appealing to ideology and 
masculinity, encouraging high levels of aggression, and providing heroic leadership by 
charismatic individuals. These were precisely the means employed by officers at Helles. 
In fact, VIII Corps on Gallipoli was an extreme example of the type of citizen army 
discussed by King. The Dardanelles campaign occurred at the very beginning of the 
British army’s learning process; for example, VIII Corps grew more proficient at trench 
warfare even while the campaign was in progress.102 However, the jury is out on the 
question of whether King’s Marshall Effect theory is more widely applicable. Further 
research is needed to see whether the theory is valid when applied to the much more 
sophisticated, better-trained, better-equipped and better-led citizen armies of the 
British Empire in the latter years of the Great War. 
   
The morale of the troops of VIII Corps was severely tested from the beginning of the 
Gallipoli campaign. However, as the rash of short-lived panics demonstrated, to use 
Clausewitz’s terminology, while soldiers’ ‘mood’ was undoubted fragile, their ‘spirit’ 
remained essentially sound. For the most part, soldiers were willing, albeit at times 
reluctantly, to engage in combat. August 1915 marked a downturn in morale, with 
optimism about the eventual outcome of the campaign being replaced by pessimism, 
                                                     
99 For the Western Front, see Tony Ashworth. Trench Warfare, 1914-1918: The Live 
and Let Live System (London: Macmillan, 1980). 
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but even then, morale was a long way from collapsing. The agency that soldiers 
exercised at various times, not least by the men of 1/6 HLI on 16 August, illustrates 
what could have happened if there had been a general and permanent breakdown of 
morale, in the sense of willingness to obey the orders of higher command.103  
This article began with Private Bert Lee’s description of men being ‘all pretty well fed 
up and worn out’. For one of Lee’s officers in 1/7 Manchesters, the endurance of his 
men was a matter of pride, resonating with contemporary notions of masculinity: 
  
The average soldier on Gallipoli broke down after a month or two. 
Comparatively few endured more than three months…The memory that 
dominates all recollections of Gallipoli is that of the grandeur of the British 
soldier [of 42nd Division] … their gallantry in the early assaults and their 
inflexible fortitude in the trenches – pestered by flies, enfeebled by dysentery, 
stinted of water, and worn out by hardships  - are a lasting title to honour.104  
 
At Cape Helles, as on the Western Front, British military morale was generally 
characterised by stoicism and resilience in the face of adverse conditions.  
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Appendix: Order of Battle of VIII Corps, August 1915 (infantry units and 
formations only)105 
 
29th Division 
86 Brigade: 
2/Royal Fusiliers 
1/Lancashire Fusiliers 
1/Royal Munster Fusiliers 
1/Royal Dublin Fusiliers 
 
87 Brigade: 
2/South Wales Borderers 
1/King's Own Scottish Borderers 
1/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
1/Border Regiment 
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88 Brigade: 
4/Worcestershire Regiment 
2/Hampshire Regiment 
1/Essex Regiment 
1/5 Royal Scots (Territorial Force.) 
 
42nd (East Lancashire) Division (Territorial Force) 
125 Brigade: 
1/5 Lancashire Fusiliers 
1/6 Lancashire Fusiliers 
1/7 Lancashire Fusiliers 
1/8 Lancashire Fusiliers 
 
126 Brigade: 
1/4 East Lancashire Regiment 
1/5 East Lancashire Regiment 
1/9 Manchester Regiment 
1/10 Manchester Regiment 
 
127 Brigade: 
1/5 Manchester Regiment 
1/6 Manchester Regiment 
1/7 Manchester Regiment 
1/8 Manchester Regiment 
 
52nd (Lowland) Division (Territorial Force) 
155 Brigade: 
1/4 Royal Scots Fusiliers 
1/5 Royal Scots Fusiliers 
1/4 King's Own Scottish Borderers 
1/5 King's Own Scottish Borderers 
 
156 Brigade: 
1/4 Royal Scots 
1/7 Royal Scots 
1/7 Scottish Rifles 
1/8 Scottish Rifles 
 
157 Brigade: 
1/5 Highland Light Infantry 
1/6 Highland Light Infantry 
1/7 Highland Light Infantry 
1/5 Argyll and Southerland Highlanders 
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Royal Naval Division  
1 Brigade: 
Drake Battalion 
Nelson Battalion 
Hawke Battalion 
Hood Battalion 
 
2 Brigade: 
No.1 Battalion, Royal Marine Light Infantry 
No.2 Battalion, Royal Marine Light Infantry 
Howe Battalion 
Anson Battalion  
 
